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ABSTRACT
Fairness is a central topic in ethics, political science and economics. A variety
of economic questions, such as charitable donation, welfare programs, taxation of
income and inheritances, are closely associated with people’s fairness preferences.
Hence it is important to take fairness and justice into account for making appropri-
ate social welfare policy. This dissertation contributes to the related literature in
understanding people’s fairness preferences by using an experimental approach. It
consists of three interrelated essays, all of which focus on fairness preferences and
redistributive decision making under risk and uncertainty. The first essay is an ex-
perimental investigation into fairness preferences and redistribution under different
rooted risks, i.e., pure-luck versus option-luck. Our experimental results reconcile
the conflict between the accountability principle and consequential egalitarianism by
suggesting that people are more inclined to the accountability principle in the pres-
ence of relatively lower income inequality but support consequential egalitarianism
in case of large income inequality or salience of extreme low payoff. The second essay
explores the dynamic evolution of a laboratory economy in which fairness preferences,
risk preferences, and income inequality are jointly determined under different redis-
tributive policies. By using a panel vector auto-regression model, we find different
patterns of interplay between subjects under different redistributive regimes. The
third essay studies how charitable giving is influenced by the performance of char-
itable organizations and associated organization costs. We study charitable giving
in a laboratory experiment, in which donors are confronted with a tradeoff between
helping people in need and the possibility of being cheated. We find evidence that
individuals exploit the shadow of fundraising cost to excuse their selfishness with
ii
a self-serving biased belief that fundraisers are corrupt. In contrast, the charitable
contribution significantly increases when the moral excuse is removed by excluding
the manipulation of costs by the fundraisers.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Justice and fairness have been in the heart of moral philosophy and political
science, from Aristotle to Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant, and then John
Rawls and Robert Nozick. Fairness is also an important subject in economics, since
deep understanding of fairness and justice can improve welfare policy evaluation
and social welfare function. A wide range of economic questions, such as charity,
public health programs, education, taxation of income and inheritances, are in close
connection with how fairness preferences of people are shaped and changed in distinct
contexts. Fairness preference is a crucial determinant of social mobility and long-run
growth in a society (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Alesina and Angelotos, 2005; Alesina
et al., 2012). In spite of the growing consensus in the importance of fairness in
understanding distributive decisions and making effective public policy design, many
open questions still await further investigation.
Studies on justice and fairness can be classified into two branches in general, nor-
mative analysis and positive analysis. Normative justice theories debate over what
standard of justice is appropriate, such as the contemporary debate over moral desert
between Rawls (1971) and Nozick (1974). A desert claim, which is the core of moral
philosophy, includes three ingredients, a deserving subject, a deserved object and a
desert basis (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). In other words, a desert claim
is that person A deserves object B because of reason C. The right desert basis is
often controversial. For example, Rawls argues that a person does not have legiti-
mate credit for natural born endowments (such as superior intelligence or athletic
abilities), since it is purely the result of the ‘natural lottery’. On the contrary, Noz-
ick claims that it contradicts the basis of Rawls’ deontological liberalism by treating
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peoples’ natural talents as collective assets. While the reasonable judgment of cor-
rect desert basis involves professional education in philosophy and political science,
ordinary people also have their own standards for fairness and justice, and apply
them consciously or unconsciously. How people understand fairness can affect not
only their personal life, but also the public policies through political process such as
deliberation and voting.
Although we will discuss the debate on fairness principles among moral philoso-
phers, normative analysis is beyond the main scope of this dissertation. This disser-
tation mainly focuses on a positive analysis. In other words, this dissertation is not
about the debate over which theory is more right or fair than others. Instead, the
goal of my dissertation is to contribute to the economics literature in understanding
fairness preferences, specifically understanding how people build and change their
fairness view depending on specific contexts. Although policy analysis is not the
main aim of this dissertation, an understanding in theoretical depth is expected to
have a salient contribution to policy designs associated with specific fairness prefer-
ences and justice concerns.
Economic experiments are employed in this dissertation. Experiments in the lab-
oratory enable us to elicit fairness preferences of people and test competing theories
in a controlled environment. In other words, experimental methods allow better
control over confounding factors and obtain more robust causal inferences.
A vast previous literature finds evidence on social preferences that explain the
deviations from pure self-interested behaviors in laboratory and field experiments
(Camerer, 2003). Fairness plays an important role when people make individual or
group decisions. However, a universal standard for fair allocation of resources and
wealth does not exist. Instead, people have different views of fairness judgment,
which vary greatly according to the specific contexts. Exploring fairness preferences
2
is particularly challenging when there is ambiguity about desert due to choice and
effort under risk and uncertainty.
This dissertation consists of three interrelated essays, all of which focus on fair-
ness preferences and redistribution under risk and uncertainty. The first essay is an
experimental investigation into fairness preferences and redistribution under differ-
ent rooted risks. The experimental design enables us to elicit different views about
distributive justice conditional on the nature of risks, i.e., whether the risk is exoge-
nously assigned in a pure-luck control condition or endogenously chosen by subjects
in an option-luck treatment. According to the accountability principle (AP), a per-
son should be responsible for his/her loss due to his/her own choices. AP predicts
significantly lower redistribution when people have the opportunity to alleviate their
financial loss in the option-luck treatment. In contrast, consequential egalitarianism
(CE) supports the same level of redistribution no matter whether or not people have
the discretionary power to control the risk, since only the consequential inequality in
economic outcomes matters in consideration of fair distribution, e.g., a discharge of
accountability for discretionary choice. Our experimental results reconcile the con-
flict between the accountability principle and consequential egalitarianism by sug-
gesting that people tend to support the accountability principle in the presence of
relatively lower income inequality but are more inclined to consequential egalitarian-
ism in case of large income inequality or salience of extreme low payoff. The results
are also important to interpret some prosocial behaviors and shed light on social and
economic policies, such as health insurance plans, job assistance programs, and so
on. The redistributive policy making needs to consider people’s fairness views that
depend on the context richness.
The second essay explores the dynamic evolution of a laboratory economy in
which fairness preferences, risk preferences and income inequality are jointly de-
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termined under different redistributive policies. In each of twenty periods of the
Partner treatment, subjects choose between a safe and a risky option and then make
redistributions within the fixed pair of subjects, while in the Spectator treatment
stakeholders make the same choice tasks but a third party makes the redistribu-
tions. The different rules mimic the distinct redistributive policies in the real world,
e.g., community-based or government-regulated. This essay introduces a panel vec-
tor auto-regression model to compare different dynamic interplays between the two
treatments. We find that in the Spectator treatment, stakeholders do not affect
each other, but mainly rely on the spectators’ decisions. In contrast, in the Partner
treatment, stakeholders show a stronger interplay in reciprocity and choices under
risk.
The third essay mimics the environment of charitable contribution to investigate
how charitable giving is influenced by the performance of charitable organizations
and associated organization costs. In real life, donors are confronted with a tradeoff
between helping people in need and the possibility of being cheated. Donors may
justify not giving while being able to excuse their selfishness with a self-serving
biased belief that the fundraisers are corrupt. In this laboratory experiment, we find
evidence that participants are more likely to exploit the ambiguity of fundraising cost
to bias their belief and contribute less when the incentive for selfishness is greater. In
contrast, the charitable contribution significantly increases when the moral excuse is
eliminated by excluding the manipulation of costs by the fundraisers. The findings
of this experiment deepen our understanding of the motives for charitable giving and
provide policy relevance to make charitable fundraising more effective. Legitimate
fundraisers can differentiate themselves by providing transparent information about
how donations are spent. Since relevant information is a public good having free-
riding problem, governments and NGOs should implement more efficient policies to
4
detect and disclose information about charitable organizations and recipients.
5
2. RECONCILING CONSEQUENTIAL EGALITARIANISM AND
ACCOUNTABILITY PRINCIPLE: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 1
We conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate how people’s fairness pref-
erences and redistribution depend on different rooted risks; specifically the risk is
exogenously assigned in a pure-luck control condition or endogenously chosen by
subjects in an option-luck treatment. According to the accountability principle, a
person should be responsible for his/her loss due to his/her own choices. In contrast,
egalitarianism supports higher level of redistribution, since only the consequential in-
equality in economic outcomes matters in consideration of fair distribution, namely
a discharge of accountability for discretionary choice. Our experimental results rec-
oncile the conflict between the accountability principle and the consequential egali-
tarianism by suggesting that people are more inclined to accountability principle in
the presence of relatively lower income inequality but support consequential egali-
tarianism in case of large income inequality or salience of extreme low payoff.
2.1 Introduction
Justice and fairness have been central research subjects in the fields of moral phi-
losophy and political science. Fairness began to play an important role in economics
from the early 1990s (Konow, 2003; Rabin, 1993), since it is closely associated with
a variety of social and economic questions, such as charitable donation, fair trade
agreements, taxation of income and inheritances, health insurance coverage. Due to
the rising income inequality in post-war developed nations, related studies become
even more critical and invoke greater interests from researchers and policy makers
1Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from ‘Xu, Zhicheng, and Marco Palma, Con-
sequential Egalitarianism vs. Accountability Principle: An Experimental Investigation. Applied 
Economics Letters 23(8): 562-565.’ Copyright 2015 Taylor & Francis
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(Piketty, 2014).
In spite of the growing consensus of the importance of fairness in understand-
ing distributive decisions and for making efficient public policy design, researchers
are far away from agreement about criteria for justice and interpretation of fair-
ness preferences, especially when income inequality is related to individual choice,
risk and controversial responsibility. In this chapter, we experimentally investigate
redistributive decision-making and fairness preferences under different rooted risks,
namely pure luck and option luck.2 In the first phase of the option-luck treatment,
subjects can endogenously determine whether they want to buy insurance to allevi-
ate a potential loss before one of three possible risky outcomes is realized with equal
probability. Simply put, subjects have the freedom to make a choice over safer or
riskier options. On the other hand, in the pure-luck control condition, subjects are
not provided such a chance. Instead the risk distributions are exogenously assigned.
The second phase of the pure-luck control condition and the option-luck treatment is
the same. Subjects are provided with the opportunity to redistribute their earnings
obtained based on their choice and luck. In the redistribution phase, subjects are
randomly paired and are asked to redistribute their earnings based on information
about their initial choices and final outcomes of the first phase.3 Participants can
choose to redistribute any amount from their earnings (including zero) to their coun-
terparts. By design, therefore, the only difference between the pure-luck control and
the option-luck treatment lies in the source of inequality, i.e., the reason subjects
lose money is either due to pure luck or to their own discretionary choices.
The experimental design enables us to examine two contradictory views about
2Dworkin (2002) defines a distinction between two types of luck adopted in our experimental
context. Brute luck, such as genetic inheritance, causes things over which we do not have con-
trol, while option luck, as a matter of choice, is something one has control at least partially by
deliberation.
3More details are included in section 3 of this chapter.
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distributive justice by comparing how people respond to income inequality in the
pure-luck control condition and in the option-luck treatment. In the view of the
accountability principle, the loss from pure luck and option luck should not be equally
evaluated. In other words, a person should be responsible for his/her loss due to
his/her own choices in the view of the accountability principle. On the other hand,
egalitarianism supports higher levels of redistribution, since only the consequential
inequality in economic outcomes matters in consideration of fair distribution, namely
a discharge of accountability for discretionary choice.
The results support some findings from previous experimental studies that indi-
viduals trade off self-interest and fairness allocation (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002), etc). However, our results
suggest that people’s normative beliefs about fair distribution are driven neither en-
tirely by consequential egalitarianism nor by the accountability principle. Instead,
our results reconcile the contradictory views by suggesting that people make redis-
tributive decisions based on the accountability principle in the presence of relatively
lower inequality but support egalitarianism in case of large income inequality or
salience of extreme low payoffs.
The tradeoff between accountability and egalitarianism captures some important
features of prosocial motives and provides some implications for public policies. For
example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act evoked a hot debate over
the appropriate coverage of health insurance plans from different views of fairness.
Chronic diseases such as obesity and cardiovascular disease are sometimes caused by
genetic makeup.4 Consequential egalitarianism and the accountability principle are
closer to achieve agreement about fair health insurance policy in this situation. But
4Genetic factors are estimated to account for over 40% of the population variation in Body Mass
Index (Hjelmborg et al., 2008; Stunkard, Foch, and Hrubec, 1986)
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obesity also often results from unhealthy life habits, e.g., night eating, binge eating,
and lack of exercise. The accountability principle suggests that obese individuals
should pay for their own healthcare if the disease is a result of their own behavior,
while a large healthcare coverage including those chronic diseases mainly resulting
from people’s own choices and behavior is supported from the view of consequen-
tial egalitarianism. With respect to the findings from our experiment, most people
may follow the accountability principle in the scenario of relatively low inequality,
considering that the consequential inequality caused by obesity is relatively small
compared to more lethal diseases such as AIDS and terminal cancer. Most people
would agree that an HIV infected child deserves medical care and sympathy, since
the child is not responsible for mother-to-child transmission. An adult is usually
believed to be responsible for his sexual behavior to prevent HIV, and differences
in fairness viewpoints related to healthcare coverage may arise under egalitarianism
or accountability. In our experiment, salient low income and inequality, parallel to
the considerable loss from lethal diseases above, lead people be more inclined to
consequential egalitarianism.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview
of the relevant literature on fairness and redistribution mainly in moral philosophy
and experimental economics. Section 3 describes the design and procedures of our
experiment. Section 4 discusses theoretical predictions. Section 5 delivers the main
results and discusses the nexus between our findings in the laboratory and reality.
Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
The studies on justice and fairness can be classified into two general branches,
normative analysis and positive analysis. Normative justice theories debate over what
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standard of justice is appropriate, such as the debate over moral desert between
Rawls (1971) and Nozick (1974). Positive analyses including our paper focus on
how people actually think and behave. In other words, the goal of this line of
work is to contribute to the literature evaluating how accurately different theories
interpret people’s distributive behaviors regarding fairness. Since public consensus
and support are critical in public policy implementation, deeper understanding in
people’s fairness preferences is helpful for policy makers.
In spite of ubiquity and appeal in our ethical lives, the bases for desert judg-
ment are far from agreement. One of the most influential principles of justice is
strict egalitarianism that would always propose an equal split of the earnings even
in cases involving work effort and production (Lamont and Favor, 1996). Rawls
(1971)’s alternative principle, which he calls Difference Principle relaxes the strong
suggestion of strict equality so long as the inequalities in question would make the
least advantaged in society materially better off. Rawls and his followers (Pojman,
1997; Rachels, 1978; Rawls, 1971) support the view of presupposed responsibility
regarding desert that one cannot claim any credits in virtue of an action or attribute
for which one is not responsible. Behind the ‘veil of ignorance’, people are unable
to know their natural endowment including innate aptitude (such as superior intel-
ligence or athletic abilities), inherited social status and wealth, all of which they
are not responsible for. Hence people would agree to support equality by a social
contract.
However, the nexus between luck and responsibility makes the right basis for
desert often controversial. Liberal egalitarianism argues that only inequalities that
arise from factors under the individual’s control should be accepted. Hence people
should be responsible only for their choices not for their luck (Arneson, 1989; Lip-
pert Rasmussen, 2001; Roemer, 2009; Vallentyne, 2002). This principle is equivalent
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to the accountability principle in the economics literature (Konow, 1996, 2000).5
Libertarians such as Hayek (1960) and Nozick (1974), on the other hand, refuse to
redistribute even if pure luck has a strong impact on inequality in economic out-
comes. Accordingly, government intervention should respect liberty and ownership
of citizens. Cupit (1996) also challenges the connection between desert and responsi-
bility. Being beautiful or born in a wealthy family are plausibly regarded as bases for
desert of various treatments, such as appraise, compensation, and so on, despite the
individual not have any accountability associated with it. Meritocracy can also be
viewed as an intermediate system in which values are determined by merit, including
achievement by effort and intellectual talent.
As economists, we pay more attention to positive analysis. Behavioral and ex-
perimental economic studies then examine which of the theories is the fairest from
the standpoint of ordinary people rather than philosophers. There is an extensive
literature in behavioral and experimental economics regarding social preferences and
distributive justice. Laboratory experiments provide ideal control for a large number
of potential confounding factors, and build a bridge between philosophical theory
and political process.
Social preferences are used to explain the deviations from pure self-interested
behaviors in the laboratory and field experiments (Camerer, 2003). There is a con-
tinuously growing body of experimental studies on fairness preferences and redistri-
bution; however, there is no consensus among economists over the interpretation of
fairness in different contexts, especially when there is ambiguity about desert due to
luck, choice, and effort (Konow, 2003). The results from our experiment suggest the
5As defined by Konow (2000) (p.1073-74), ‘the accountability principle requires that a person’s
fair allocation (e.g., of income) vary in proportion to the relevant variables that he can influence
(e.g., work effort) but not according to those that he cannot reasonably influence (e.g., a physical
handicap)’.
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dependence of fairness judgment on the distinct contexts, rather than a universal
standard.
According to the evidence from experimental economics, the least controversial
finding might be that people are more willing to accept income inequality resulting
from work effort rather than from windfall (Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren, 2002;
Durante, Putterman, and van der Weele, 2014; Fershtman, Gneezy, and List, 2012;
Hoffman et al., 1994; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008). Earnings from work effort are
perceived as more legitimate entitlement than from pure luck. This is in line with
Locke (1988)’s labor theory of property rights, which holds that property originally
comes about by the exertion of labor upon natural resources. For instance, Hoffman
et al. (1994) find that the dictators behave more selfishly if the distributive right is
earned by scoring high in a knowledge quiz compared to randomly assigned. Cherry,
Frykblom, and Shogren (2002) find almost no sharing when the dictators earned
their gains by real effort. Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) report similar results from an
experiment in which earnings are determined based on the number of correct answers
in exam questions. Fershtman, Gneezy, and List (2012) conducted dictator games
and trust games preceded by tedious effort or GMAT exam questions. They also
find a stronger tendency for selfish distribution compared to the standard dictator
game and trust game. In Durante, Putterman, and van der Weele (2014), individu-
als’ redistribution power is exogenously determined, by performance in a knowledge
quiz or by skills in a game, at the same time the experiment allows variations in the
efficiency of redistribution and whether redistribution decisions were made ex-ante
or ex-post. Their results suggest that when income uncertainty is unfolded, sub-
jects are reluctant to redistribute to their counterparts if they earn money by effort
or skill. To investigate how people make tradeoffs between entitlement, needs, and
self-interest, Cappelen et al. (2013) conducted a real-effort dictator experiment us-
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ing student subjects from rich countries (Norway and Germany) and poor countries
(Uganda and Tanzania). They find evidence for a mixture of the three motivations
in distributive decisions. To see how unequal opportunities affect the demand for
distributive justice, Eisenkopf, Fischbacher, and Fllmi-Heusi (2013) conducted an ex-
periment in which subjects earn money from a quiz and then redistribute it among
themselves and other participants. They find that unequal opportunities to study
some questions in advance evoke stronger preference for redistribution compared to
the situation when the allocation is purely determined by luck. But they deny purely
meritocratic and purely egalitarian distribution. Parallel to the theoretical frame-
work, some previous experiments (Krawczyk, 2010; Michelbach et al., 2003; Thum
and Weichenrieder, 2000) replicate the situation of ‘veil of ignorance’ (Harsanyi,
1953; Rawls, 1971). For example, in Krawczyk (2010), pre-committed redistribution
is strongly supported. Before knowing who would actually win, participants selected
transfers plan that the winners will pay to the group. And the average transfers were
about 20% lower in the situations in which winning was determined by performance
rather than by pure luck. However, his design involves the difficulty for subjects to
understand the effects of effort. Additionally, in his experiment, participants have to
rely on their fairness concern regarding effort and luck in the group to make redis-
tribution decision. The more sophistication in the design implies more confounding
factors.
Our experiment is associated with fairness principles that disagree on responsi-
bility for loss and gain under risk. de Barros et al. (2009) summarize the commonly
shared view about income inequality regarding different sources that ‘people usually
tolerate (and maybe agree with) income inequality arising from differences in choices
made, effort extended, and talents put to use by individuals, while they view as
fundamentally unfair inequality arising from differences in opportunities.’ However,
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since the multiplicity of desert judgment and fairness views lies in the ambiguity in
varying situations, distributive justice and fairness preferences become more compli-
cated and controversial when choice, luck, merit and effort come together.
Dworkin (2002) defines a distinction between two types of luck adopted in our
experimental context. Brute luck, such as genetic inheritance, causes things over
which we do not have control, while option luck, as a matter of choice, is something
one can have a part of control by deliberation. According to the ‘common view’, peo-
ple would always perceive responsibility for their own option luck and entitlement
for their earnings. However, pure luck does not necessarily mean redistribution,
while responsibility does not deny redistribution. Going back to the example in
the introduction section, should a patient suffering from obesity-caused diseases be
responsible for his/her health insurance cost? Further, does an AIDS patient who
acquired HIV by unprotected sex also deserve medical care and equal respect com-
pared to a newborn that contracted the disease from the mother? Our experimental
results suggest that the answer to these questions may vary depending on the views
on choice and luck, as well as the specific situations. Therefore, it is usually more
complicated if there is a nexus between desert and responsibility, especially when the
intensity of loss matters.
2.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
There are three sets of treatments and controls in our experimental design. Con-
sider the Low Income Inequality (LII) treatment as an illustrative example. Each
session in the treatment includes two phases, an insurance purchase choice followed
by the distribution phase. In the first phase, given an endowment of 20 points (Ex-
perimental Currency Unit, each point=$0.50), participants were informed that one of
three possible outcomes would be realized with equal probability. Before the outcome
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was unfolded, the subjects were asked to decide whether or not to buy an insurance
to alleviate potential losses. The insurance cost is 5 points in the LII treatment.
As shown in Table 2.1, the subjects were informed that in case of outcome A, 20
points would be delivered regardless of insurance purchase. Hence net payment is
15 points for a participant who purchased insurance, or 20 points for a participant
without insurance. Outcome B caused a loss that can be recovered by the insurance.
If the subject did not buy the insurance, only 10 points will be delivered. Outcome
C is an inevitable loss irrespective of insurance purchase. The subjects received a
net payment of 10 points in the case of outcome C. In the experimental sessions,
subjects are also shown the payoff table.
Table 2.1: Net Payoff Matrix in the Low Income Inequality Treatment
A B C
Purchased insurance 15 15 10
Did not purchase insurance 20 10 10
Therefore, in the treatments, participants can endogenously choose the risk sit-
uation they prefer. In the meantime, the freedom to choose implies associated ac-
countability.
During the second phase of the treatments, participants were anonymously and
randomly matched with a sequence of eight other participants and the high-income
subject in each pair was asked to make redistribution decisions to each counterpart.
In case of a tie in earnings, the computer skipped the redistribution task. In each
matching, the high-income participant was provided with information about the
insurance buying decision of their counterpart, as well as their realized outcomes.
Distributors can transfer any amount they want from their earnings, including zero.
15
Only one of the redistribution outcomes was chosen to be binding. The redistribution
outcomes were not shown to everyone until the end of experiment. Therefore, our
design excludes wealth effects and reputation effects.
In the corresponding control condition for low income inequality, subjects were
not provided with such a chance to buy insurance. The risky scenarios are exoge-
nously assigned to them as pure luck. Each participant was randomly assigned to
one of the risky scenarios in Table 2.1. That is, one half of them have 2/3 probability
to earn 15 and 1/3 probability to earn 10, while the other half have 1/3 probability
to earn 20 and 2/3 probability to earn 10. The redistribution phase in the control
groups is the same as the treatment groups. By this design, therefore, the only dif-
ference between the control condition and the treatment is the reason why subjects
lose money, due to pure luck or by their own choices.
The other two treatments, namely medium income inequality (MII) and high
income inequality (HII), are described in the Table 2.2. The difference is the size of
the payoffs which result in medium and high income disparities respectively.
Table 2.2: Net Payoff Matrix in MII and HII Treatments
MII Treatment
A B C
Purchased insurance 15 10 5
Did not purchase insurance 20 5 5
HII Treatment
A B C
Purchased insurance 10 10 0
Did not purchase insurance 20 0 0
The experiment was conducted at the Economics Research Laboratory (ERL)
at Texas A&M University in October and November 2014. The experiment was
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computerized with the software ‘z-Tree’ (Fischbacher, 2007). The recruitment was
conducted with the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE)
(Greiner, 2004). A total of 228 participants are students of both genders (85 females)
and various majors studying at Texas A&M University. We use a between-subject
design. Each subject participated in one session only. Each session lasted approxi-
mately 30 minutes. Before entering the experimental laboratory, participants were
told that they would receive a show-up compensation fee of $10 upon completion of
the tasks and they would also have the potential of extra earnings based on their ran-
domly assigned role, luck and performance. But they were not provided with details
of the experiment. The average payment was $16, including the show-up fee. After
being seated at separate computer terminals, subjects received written instructions
that were also read aloud by the experimenters. To ensure complete understanding
by all subjects, a set of test questions that were computerized in z-Tree had to be
answered correctly before the experiments began.
2.4 Theoretical Predictions
A variety of social preference based models have been developed to interpret the
motives behind phenomena and predict how people respond to different contexts.
Outcome-based models of inequality aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999) assume that people’s fairness concerns are the final income inequality,
irrespective of the causes for inequality. Obviously, outcome-based models predict
the same redistribution in the pure-luck control and option-luck treatment in case
of the same income distribution in the first phase. Further, within the option-luck
treatment, the redistributive decision makers will not consider the difference between
facing a counterpart suffering from an avoidable loss (event B) and another coun-
terpart losing the same amount of money due to an unavoidable loss (event C). For
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example, participant 1 did not purchase insurance and received 20 points because
of good luck (event A). Participant 2 purchased insurance but received 10 point be-
cause of event C. Participant 3 did not purchase insurance but also received 10 point
because of event B, in which case the loss could be avoided by purchasing insur-
ance. The outcome-based models predict no discrepancy in redistribution between
the matched pair of participant 1 and 2 and the pair of participant 1 and 3.
However, those models were challenged by social preference models based on in-
tention and procedures and supported by plentiful experimental evidence (Charness
and Rabin, 2002; Cox, 2004; Dana, Cain, and Dawes, 2006; Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger, 2004; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Ku and Salmon, 2013; Rabin, 1993).
Therefore, this strand of social preference models predicts diverse fairness views
about the same income distribution with different sources of inequality.
Similarly, the accountability principle of fairness draws attention from behavioral
and experimental economists (Becker, 2013; Cappelen et al., 2007; Konow, 1996,
2000, 2001; Moellerstroem, Reme, and Sorensen, 2015). According to the account-
ability principle, exogenously assigned and endogenously chosen risks should not be
equally evaluated. And neither should be the loss from avoidable risks and pure bad
luck. In other words, a person should be responsible for his loss from his own choice
that affect risk distribution and associated material loss. Therefore, the redistribu-
tive decisions made by subjects can be used to measure the extent to which people
believe they should be responsible for their own option-luck.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Decisions in the First Phase
A total of 78 participants were assigned into the pure-luck control group, while
150 subjects participated in the treatment sessions (option-luck treatment). Table
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2.3 shows that 111 (74%) of 150 participants in the treatment group chose the safer
option. In our LII treatment and MII treatment, about two-thirds of subjects chose
to buy insurance. Not surprisingly, in the HII treatment where the potential loss
resulting from not buying insurance is higher, 47 out of 56 subjects (84%) chose to
buy the insurance.
Table 2.3: Insurance Purchase Choices Made by Treated Subjects in the First Phase
Insurance purchase
Yes No Total
Low Income Inequality 20 10 30
Medium Income Inequality 44 20 64
High Income Inequality 47 9 56
Total 111 39 150
2.5.2 Redistributive Decisions
We then further our analysis by comparing the overall average distributive de-
cisions made by subjects in the second phase of the controls and treatments. The
histograms in Figure 2.1 depict the distributions of transfers made by the distrib-
utors. The individuals trade off fairness and self-interests. People are reluctant to
make equal earnings in both of the controls and treatments. The distinction between
the controls and treatments is clear. Overall, the distributors in the treatments did
not transfer to their counterparts at all amongst over 60% of transfer decisions. And
about one fifth of transfers were less than 20% of gross earnings before redistribution.
In contrast, the distributors made significantly higher transfers to counterparts in
the control groups. Slightly over 40% of transfers were zero, while more than 40% of
transfers were equal or more than 20% of their gross earnings in the first phase. The
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lower panel of Figure 2.1 conveys similar information by depicting the distribution of
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Figure 2.1: Transfer Histograms
Comparison between the pure-luck controls and option-luck treatments are pro-
vided in Figure 2.2 and Table 2.4. We again find sharp evidence for the different
distributive behaviors with or without the opportunity to protect against risk by pur-
chasing insurance. The average amount of transfer was about 2.38 ECUs (or 15.54%
of gross earnings) in the pure-luck control condition, significantly higher than the
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average transfer in the option-luck treatment, 1.07 ECUs (7.77%) (p < 0.001, Mann-
Whitney U -test, clustered by subject).
A further investigation into the additional income inequality pure-luck controls
and option-luck treatments show more interesting results. The largest disparity of
transfer between the option-luck treatment and the pure-luck control lies in the
low-income inequality treatment (1.44% vs. 20.73%, 0.22 vs. 3.20 ECUs, p <
0.001, Mann-Whitney U -test, clustered by subject). Nevertheless, the differences
in medium-income inequality and high-income inequality become much smaller and
insignificant. Comparing the distribution between the pure-luck control and option-
luck treatment in MII and HII pairs, the differences in transfer amount between are
less than 1 ECU and insignificant. This lends support to the notion that people
have a stronger tendency to support the accountability principle when the potential
income gap is relatively small.
Table 2.4: Transfers Comparison between Controls and Treatments
Transfer (%) Transfer (ECU)
Treatment Control p-value Treatment Control p-value
Total 7.77 15.54 0.001 1.07 2.38 0.001
N=334 N=202 N=334 N=202
LII 1.44 20.73 0.000 0.22 3.20 0.000
N=58 N=50 N=58 N=50
MII 8.46 13.56 0.330 1.32 2.14 0.271
N=157 N=72 N=157 N=72
HII 9.96 14.06 0.069 1.14 2.09 0.115
N=119 N=80 N=80 N=80
Notes: p-values are reported for Mann-Whitney U -tests clustered by subject.
However, these comparisons do not refer to the specific level of income inequal-
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Figure 2.2: A Comparison of Transfer in ECU between Control and Treatment
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the income gap is 5 ECUs, the average amount of transfer was about 2.60 ECUs
(or 18.42% out of gross earnings) in the pure-luck control, significantly higher than
the average transfer in the option-luck treatment, 0.46 ECUs (3.67%) (p < 0.001,
Mann-Whitney U -test, clustered by subject). When the income gap is 10 ECUs,
the differences in transfer between the pure-luck control and option-luck treatment
become considerably closer and insignificant (p > 0.1, Mann-Whitney U -test, clus-
tered by subject). And the difference becomes negligible when the income inequality
is greater than 10 ECUs. The significant difference in redistribution between the
pure-luck control and the option-luck treatment is also found when the distributors
face counterparts who earned more than 0. In these scenarios, the average amount
of transfer was about 2.64 ECUs (16.83%) in the pure-luck control, significantly
higher than the average transfer in the option-luck treatment, 1.02 ECUs (6.47%)
(p < 0.002, Mann-Whitney U -test, clustered by subject). However, these differences
become insignificant when the receivers earned zero from the risk-taking phase.
Table 2.5: Transfers Comparison between Controls and Treatments
Transfer (%) Transfer (ECU)
Treatment Control p-value Treatment Control p-value
∆ = 5 3.67 18.42 0.000 0.46 2.60 0.000
N=130 N=73 N=130 N=73
∆ = 10 9.75 13.37 0.144 1.24 1.92 0.105
N=181 N=91 N=181 N=91
∆>10 15.43 15.13 0.905 3.09 3.02 0.905
N=23 N=39 N=23 N=39
PI=0 10.51 13.63 0.251 1.17 1.79 0.192
N=108 N=62 N=108 N=62
PI>0 6.47 16.38 0.001 1.02 2.64 0.002
N=226 N=140 N=226 N=140
Notes: ∆ is income gap. PI is partner’s income from the first phase. p-values are
reported for Mann-Whitney U -tests clustered by subject.
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A potential interpretation of the findings from our experiment is that most people
evaluate fairness by multiple principles, one of which may dominate depending on
the income gap and salience of related factors.
2.5.3 Econometric Analysis
In order to provide econometric evidence, we employ the model of fairness prefer-
ences proposed by Cappelen et al. (2007) that allows flexible forms of fairness views.
We adapt their model in the context of our experiment as:
V = y − (y − F t)2/2βX2
where the interior solution y∗ is given by y∗ = F t + βX2. Vi is a utility function of
individual i ; yi is the post-distribution payoff of individual i ; β measures tolerance
for advantageous inequality; and X is the total earning in the group. We assume
that the distributors endorse either the accountability principle (AP) or consequen-
tial egalitarianism (CE). Accordingly F ti is the fairness reference point for individual
i of type t, either FAP or FCE. For CE preference, the fairness reference point is the
average payoff in the group, i.e., the utility function is the same as Bolton and Ock-
enfels (2000). Since there is no room for option luck in the pure-luck control group,
the disparity between AP and CE preference does not exist. AP preference is rela-
tively complicated in the option-luck treatment group. While CE distributors’ fairest
transfer is such that makes equal earnings, AP distributors discount this amount by
the relative weights of pure-luck and option-luck. To be specific, consider an example
in the high-income inequality pure-luck control and option-luck treatment. Due to
the random group assignment and pure luck in the high-income inequality control,
participants have a 1/6 probability to earn 20 points, 1/3 probability to earn 10
points, and 1/2 probability to earn 0 points. Accordingly, the probability to see a
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pair of a distributor earning 20 points and a receiver earning 0 points is 1/12. FCEi
is 10 points in this case. Rather, consider another pair of participants who also
earned 20 points and 0 points in the first phase of the high-income inequality treat-
ment. The distributor endogenously changed the probability of earning 20 points
from 1/6 to 1/3 by not buying insurance, while the receiver changed the probability
of earning nothing from 1/2 to 2/3. So despite of the same income distribution in
the pure-luck control and option-luck treatment, the probability of this distribution
is 1/12 in the pure-luck control and 2/9 in the option luck treatment. Hence AP
distributors’ fairest transfer should be discounted by the relative weight of pure luck,
3/8 (1/12 out of 2/9) in this treatment. Similarly, if the receiver bought insurance,
then the discount factor is 3/4 (1/12 out of 1/9). We summarize the decomposition
of pure-luck and option-luck in Table 2.6. Then the calculation of FCE and FAP
is straightforward. For brevity, we only show the decomposition in the high-income
inequality control and treatment.
Table 2.6: Decomposition of pure luck and option luck (HII)
Person 1/2’s Person 2 Prob. in the Prob. in the Discount
earning insurance pure luck control option luck treatment Factor
20 0 Yes 1/12=1/6*1/2 1/9=1/3*1/3 3/4
20 0 No 1/12=1/6*1/2 2/9=1/3*2/3 3/8
20 10 Yes 1/18=1/6*1/3 2/9=1/3*2/3 1/4
10 0 Yes 1/6=1/3*1/2 2/9=2/3*1/3 3/4
10 0 No 1/6=1/3*1/2 4/9=2/3*2/3 3/8
The model was estimated as:
y∗ = F t + βX2 + ε
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In the econometric model, there are two key parameters of interest that are needed
for identification, β (the measure of tolerance for unfairness) and λ (the likelihood
of an individual to have a fairness view of accountability principle). To capture the
heterogeneity of β, we assume that β is normally distributed, s.t. β ∼ N(β, σ2µ). And
the idiosyncratic error term is also assumed to be independently normally distributed,
i.e, ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε). The likelihood contribution of a distributor is calculated by the
combination of the likelihood of two views of fairness principles.
Li = λL
AP
i + (1− λ)LCEi
Table 2.7 reports the results. When the income gap is 5 points, the low value
of β implies less tolerance for unfair allocation, and the likelihood of a distributor
being classified to have a view of accountability principle is 74%. If the income gap
is 10 points, the distributors care less about fairness ( β = 0.017 ). Meanwhile,
the likelihood of a distributor having a view of accountability principle reduces to
63%. Further, this likelihood is weakly significant if the income gap is over 10 points.
Similarly, if the earning of the receiver is positive in the first phase, then β is very
low at 0.002, while the likelihood of the distributor having an AP view is very high
(82%). But when the distributor faced a counterpart earning nothing in the first
phase, he/she is only 32% likely to be classified to hold AP view of fairness.
2.5.4 Robustness
To check whether our estimates are robust to the utility functional form, we also
estimate the model with the utility functional form described in Cappelen et al.
(2013)’s main specification:
V = y − (y − F t)2/2βX
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Table 2.7: Estimates of β and λ (main specification)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Parameter ∆ = 5 ∆ = 10 ∆>10 PI>0 PI = 0
β 0.001** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.002*** 0.032***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003)
λ 0.744*** 0.634*** 0.092 0.816*** 0.323**
(0.205) (0.141) (0.243) (0.127) (0.130)
-LL 394.179 601.333 147.959 824.764 304.239
Obs 203 271 62 366 170
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
We report the results in Table 8. Although the estimates are different in magni-
tude from our main specification, they show the same direction and are consistent
with our conclusions.
Table 2.8: Estimates of β and λ (Robustness Check)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Parameter ∆ = 5 ∆ = 10 ∆>10 PI>0 PI = 0
β 0.042*** 0.217*** 0.230*** 0.063*** 0.358***
(0.013) (0.023) (0.037) (0.012) (0.024)
λ 0.483*** 0.454*** 0.070 0.570*** 0.215*
(0.213) (0.134) (0.237) (0.133) (0.127)
-LL 385.761 564.231 145.612 802.550 296.536
Obs 203 271 62 366 170
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has reported the results of a laboratory experiment investigating
how people respond to different sources of risks in consideration of distributive jus-
tice. Our findings confirm some results from previous experimental studies that
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individuals trade off self-interest and fairness allocation and tend to understand fair-
ness based on the accountability principle sometimes. By comparing the distributive
decisions with respect to exogenously and endogenously chosen risks (e.g., pure-luck
versus option-luck), our experiment also sheds light on the conflict between conse-
quential egalitarianism and the accountability principle in explaining redistributive
behaviors. Rather than completely supporting consequential egalitarianism or ac-
countability principle, our results suggest reconciliation between them. People show
a strong tendency for the accountability principle in case of relatively lower inequal-
ity but exhibit a tendency to consequential egalitarianism in case of large income
inequality or salience of extreme low payoff. Therefore, fairness preferences and jus-
tice judgments should be understood in specific contexts varying in the choice, luck,
income gap, and so on.
Returning to the normative literature, our experimental results show that people
support an integration of Rawls’ difference principle and libertarian egalitarianism
in consideration of fairness. Regarding the policy implications, the importance of
helping the people in need is supported, even though the needy people’s misfortune
is largely determined by their own faults. As discussed in the introduction AIDS and
lung cancer patients should also be helped and respected even though the misfortune
came out of bad life habits. In contrast, the redistribution from high income people
to medium income people depends on the context richness. In these situations, the
distributive policy making needs to consider the accountability principle for fairness.
Consider the obesity example where most of the chronic diseases associated with
obesity are not lethal. The public is reluctant to share the health insurance costs
with obese people who have unhealthy life habits.
There are a few open questions yet answered in this paper. This experiment was
conducted with college students in the U.S. As discussed in Alesina and Angeletos
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(2005), European countries have a stronger preference for redistribution than North-
American societies due to their different beliefs regarding the role of luck and effort
in determining wealth. Thus it would be interesting to examine whether there are
different fairness preferences in other societies.
In addition, although our findings are convincing, the underlying motivation of re-
distributive decisions is subject to other interpretations. An alternative explanation
is moral wiggle room (self-serving bias) that hypothesizes that people may exploit
the veil of ambiguity in the distributional situations as moral excuses to endorse
their own self-interest by sacrificing fairness even though they do not really believe
the moral excuses (Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels, 2005; Dana, Weber, and Kuang,
2007). An investigation of distributive decisions made by spectators would be mean-
ingful to answer this question. Moellerstroem, Reme, and Sorensen (2015) report
the result from a similar laboratory experiment with only redistributions made by
spectators. Indeed, in absence of personal stakes, the impartial spectators are much
more willing to make equal post-distribution earnings.
2.7 Appendix: Experimental Instruction
2.7.1 General Instruction
This part is the same for every subject.
Welcome to this experiment! Before the session begins, you will carefully read
the basic instruction in 20 minutes. Please feel free to ask questions if you are
confused. You will have to answer some questions to check that you understand the
instructions. During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other
participants. If you have a question, raise your hand. We will come to answer your
questions. Sometimes you may have to wait a short while before the experiment
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continues. Please be patient. Thanks for your patience and cooperation.
Your earnings in the experiment will be calculated in points. Points will be con-
verted to US dollars at the exchange rate shown on the screen. Upon the completion
of the experiment, you will also receive a participation fee of $10. At the end of the
experiment your total earnings will be paid out to you in cash.
Following the main choice tasks, we will ask you some questions about your socio-
demographic characteristics. Your responses are helpful in that they can be used to
explain some of the decisions you make in the experimental exercises. Please note
that your responses will not be linked to your name, nor made available to anyone
outside the research team. Your ID number is used to match your responses so that
they are not confused with anyone else’s, and will be used to determine your earnings
from the experiment.
We ask that you not talk with anyone else today except for the designated re-
searchers conducting this experiment.
We expect that the entire session will take less than one hour. Your participation
is completely voluntary. You may ask questions at any time during the experiment.
2.7.2 Instruction for the First Phase of HII Treatment6
The instructions were handed out to the participants and also were shown on the
computer screen.
Please read the instructions on your desk and screen. To make sure you com-
pletely understand the procedures, you will answer some questions. Once you are
ready, please click on the red button below and answer the questions on the screen.
The three following situations will be realized with equal probability. Before the
6For sake of brevity, we do not provide the instructions for MII- and LII-treatment and control,
which are quite similar with HII treatment and control.
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outcome is unfolded, you are asked to decide whether or not to buy an insurance
that costs 10 points.
A: You will receive 20 points minus the insurance cost (if you buy it).
B: You will have an avoidable loss contingent on whether the subject buys insur-
ance. If you buy the insurance, you will receive 20 points minus the insurance cost.
Otherwise, you will receive 0 point.
C: You will receive 0 point regardless of whether or not you buy insurance.
Exchange rate: 2 points=$1
A B C
Having insurance 10 10 0
Not having insurance 20 0 0
Once the participants clicked ready button, they will answer some simple ques-
tions in z-Tree before going to the next step.
Q1. Suppose event A happened. You did not purchase insurance. How many
points do you earn?
Q2. Suppose event B happened. You bought insurance. How many points do
you earn?
Q3. Suppose event C happened. You did not insurance. How many points do
you earn?
2.7.3 Instruction for the Second Phase of HII Treatment
Participants did not see this instruction until the end of the first phase.
Welcome to the second phase of this experiment. In this phase, you may have
the opportunity to redistribute earnings between you and your counterpart. During
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the second phase of the experiment, you will be anonymously and randomly matched
with a sequence of eight other participants. In each scenario, you will be asked to
make redistribution decisions only if your earning in the first phase is higher than
your counterpart. Therefore, please be patient if you are not the decision maker.
Your counterpart will not see who make the decision. Your counterpart will not
know the redistribution results until the end of this experiment. Only one scenario
will be randomly chosen to distribute payment.
The distributors received the following information on screen while making dis-
tributive decisions. The following is an example.
Remember that (You bought the insurance.) Event B happened to you.
Now you are matched with a counterpart. (Your counterpart did not buy the insur-
ance.) Event B happened to your counterpart.
Your income before redistribution is 10 points. Your counterpart’s income before
redistribution is 0 points.
Please input the amount you will give to your counterpart. You can input any
integer number between 0 and your earnings inclusive.
2.7.4 Instruction for the First Phase of HII Control
One half of participants in this room will be randomly chosen to face scenario
one, while the other half will face scenario two.
In case of scenario one, you will face three possible outcomes with equal proba-
bility. The table shows the payoff of each outcome. Exchange rate: 2 points=$1.
A B C
10 10 0
In case of scenario two, you will face three possible outcomes with equal proba-
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bility. The table shows the payoff of each outcome. Exchange rate: 2 points=$1.
A B C
20 0 0
2.7.5 Instruction for the Second Phase of HII Control
Participants did not see this instruction until the end of the first phase.
Welcome to the second phase of this experiment. In this phase, you may have
the opportunity to redistribute earnings between you and your counterpart. During
the second phase of the experiment, you will be anonymously and randomly matched
with a sequence of eight other participants. In each scenario, you will be asked to
make redistribution decisions only if your earning in the first phase is higher than
your counterpart. Therefore, please be patient if you are not the decision maker.
Your counterpart will not see who make the decision. Your counterpart will not
know the redistribution results until the end of this experiment. Only one scenario
will be randomly chosen to distribute payment.
The distributors received the following information on screen while making dis-
tributive decisions. The following is an example.
In the first phase, your counterpart had 2/3 chance to receive 10 points, and 1/3
chance to receive 0 point.
Your income before redistribution is 20 points. Your counterpart’s income before
redistribution is 10 points.
Please input the amount you will give to your counterpart. You can input any
integer number between 0 and your earnings inclusive.
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3. AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON COEVOLUTION OF RISK
PREFERENCES AND FAIRNESS PREFERENCES: A PANEL VAR
ANALYSIS
We explore the dynamics of a laboratory economy in which risk preferences,
fairness preferences, and income inequality are jointly determined under different
rules. In each of twenty periods of the Partner treatment, subjects choose between a
safe and a risky option and then make redistributions within the fixed paired subjects,
while in the Spectator treatment stakeholders make the same choice tasks but a third
party makes the redistributions. The different dynamic interplays between the two
treatments are examined based on a panel vector auto-regression model. We find
that in the Spectator treatment, stakeholders do not affect each other, but make
decision relying on the spectators’ decisions. By contrast, in the Partner treatment,
stakeholders show a stronger interplay in reciprocity and choices under risk.
3.1 Introduction
Justice and fairness have been of essential concern in the fields of moral philos-
ophy and political science and began to evoke growing interests from mainstream
economics starting in the early 1990s (Konow 2003, Rabin 1993). The distribution
of income and wealth can significantly affect the stability and potential for devel-
opment in a society, due to disagreements about what constitutes a ‘fair’ allocation
and appropriate redistribution of income and wealth (Alesina and Angeletos 2005,
Alesina and Glaeser 2004, Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Benabou and Tirole 2006). So-
cial preferences are a central part of human culture. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2006) define social preferences as ‘those customary beliefs and values that ethnic,
religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to genera-
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tion.’ Culture means beliefs about the consequences of one’s actions, or values and
preferences. There is a large body of literature related to the interplay between in-
stitutions, culture, and economic outcomes. Institutional views assert strong causal
effects of institutional quality on economic performance (Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson, 2001, 2005; North, 1981). Further, institutions can also affect economic
inequality and redistribution (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Besley and Burgess, 2002).
But the same institutions could function very differently in different cultures. Recent
literature documents the role of culture in economic performance (Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales, 2006; Greif and Tabellini, 2010) and institutional formation (Tabellini,
2010; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2015; Greif and Tabellini, 2010). On the con-
trary, some studies show evidence that institutional arrangements can shape culture
(Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2007). A recent set of experiments also suggest that
institutions affect behavior and beliefs (Dal Bo´, Foster, and Putterman, 2010; Sutter,
Haigner, and Kocher, 2010; Kamei, Putterman, and Tyran, 2015).
This study contributes to the literature by implementing an experimental in-
vestigation of the dynamic evolution of an economy in which fairness preferences,
redistributive policies, and income inequality are jointly determined under different
institutional arrangements. In each of twenty periods of the ‘Partner treatment ’, a
fixed pair of partners chooses between a safe and a risky option in the first phase
and then make redistributive decisions in the second phase. A second ‘Spectator
treatment ’ consists of three subjects in each group; two stakeholders make the same
choice tasks during the first phase, while a spectator makes redistributive decisions in
the second phase. The theoretical and empirical implications can be reexamined in
a laboratory experiment where the confounding factors can be more easily removed.
However, in a dynamic economy, people’s social preferences and redistributive behav-
ior can be mutually determined, and they are also affected by social preferences and
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redistribution made by others. Therefore, we investigate the coevolution of fairness
preferences and risk preferences by estimating dynamic parameters through a panel
VAR approach (pVAR), which treats all the variables in the system as endogenous
and interdependent, providing a deeper understanding of the direction of causality.
Directed acyclic graphs (DAG) are used to summarize the relationship among the
variables in the pVAR estimation.
We find different patterns of interplay between subjects under the two redistribu-
tive institutions. On the one hand, in the Spectator treatment, the spectators can
use redistribution as a tool to affect choices made by the stakeholders. In partic-
ular, greater redistribution leads to higher likelihood of stakeholders choosing the
safe option. But the spectators’ fairness preferences are not affected by shocks of
the choices made by the two stakeholders. A positive shock of a stakeholder’ income
escalates the redistributive behaviors of spectators. Further, the stakeholders are not
affected by how their counterparts make choices. On the other hand, in the Partner
treatment, paired stakeholders have a much stronger tendency to choose the same
option over time. Further, they show some reciprocity. Partners also adjust their
choices according to the observed inequality aversion of their counterparts. We also
find evidence that partners’ fairness preferences can be partially changed by their
counterparts’ choices but not their incomes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the design and pro-
cedures of our experiment. Section 3 provides a simple theoretical model. Based on
this model, we introduce the methodology of panel VAR and estimate the dynamics
of key parameters in section 4. We also deliver the causality direction by DAGs and
impulse responses from pVAR estimates. Section 5 concludes.
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3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
Our experiment includes four treatments, namely Partner ONE, Partner TWO,
Spectator ONE and Spectator TWO, distinguished by the payment amount of the
safe alternative and the assignment of redistributive power. Consider the Partner
One condition as an illustrative example first. At the beginning of the Partner ONE
treatment, each participant is told that they will be anonymously and randomly
matched with another participant for the whole session that last 20 periods. Each
period includes two phases, a phase of risk choice followed by the distribution phase.
In the first phase of each period, each participant is asked to choose either a safe
alternative (S) that pays 4 points (Experimental Currency Unit, each point=$0.20)
or a risky alternative (R) that will deliver either nothing or 10 points with equal
probability. In the second phase of each period, after revealing all choices, realized
outcomes and cumulative wealth for both counterparts in the previous periods, the
subject is asked to decide how many points he/she would distribute to his/her coun-
terpart if his/her earnings in the current period are higher than his/her counterpart.
The redistribution procedure is skipped in case of equal earnings. The partner TWO
treatment is all the same except that the payment of the safe alternative is 5 points
instead of 4 points.
In the Spectator ONE treatment, three participants are anonymously and ran-
domly assigned into a group for the whole session of 20 periods. Two group members
are randomly chosen to be stakeholders who only participate in the first phase of each
period, while the third group member is assigned to be a spectator only participat-
ing in the second phase of each period. They remain in the same role for the whole
session of the experiment. In the first stage of each period, the two stakeholders face
the same decisions in the Partner One treatment. In the second phase of each period,
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the spectator makes redistributive decisions from the high income stakeholder to the
low income stakeholder. The redistribution procedure is skipped in case of equal
earnings. The redistributive decisions are then shown to the stakeholders afterward.
Spectator TWO treatment uses the same design only except that the payment of
the safe alternative is 5 points. The screenshots of redistribution phase in zTree are
shown in the appendix.
The experiment was conducted in the Economics Research Laboratory (ERL) at
Texas A&M University during October and November in 2014. The experiment was
computerized with the software ‘z-Tree’ (Fischbacher 2007). The recruitment was
conducted with the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE)
(Greiner 2004). A total of 228 participants are Texas A&M University students of
both genders (85 females) and various majors. In a between-subject design, each sub-
ject only participated in one session. Each session lasted about 60 minutes. Before
entering the experimental laboratory, participants were told that they would receive
a show-up fee of $10 upon completion of the tasks and they would also have the po-
tential of extra payoffs based on their randomly assigned role, luck and performance.
But they were not provided with the details of the experiment. The average payment
for stakeholders was $29.6, including the show-up fee. The spectators received $30
(including the show-up fee) for the whole session regardless of their decisions.
After being seated at separate computer terminals, subjects received written in-
structions that were also read aloud by the experimenters. To ensure complete
understanding by all subjects, a set of test questions computerized in z-Tree needs
be correctly answered before the experiments began.
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3.3 Model and Measurement
In order to explore the joint dynamics of fairness preferences and risk preferences
under different redistributive institutions in our experimental context, we introduce
a simple model that defines key parameters used for further analysis.
3.3.1 Partner Treatment
We first describe the decision making in the Partner treatment. In the second
phase of each period, an individual is assumed to be motivated by his own earning
and fairness preferences when redistributing the total income earned in the first stage
with his counterpart. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) provide a utility function based on
the assumption of inequality aversion. In a two-person game, e.g., Partner treatment
in our experiment, the utility of person i in each period is
Ui(yi, X) = yi − (1/2− yi/X)2/δi (3.1)
where yi is the post-redistribution monetary payoff for the high income stakeholder
i, X is the total payoff in the group, yi/X is player i ’s relative payoff. The second
term of the utility function captures the psychological loss from the payoff deviating
from equal share within the group. The parameter δi measures the tolerance for
inequality. By assumption, if δi is very close to zero, the function is maximized when
yi/X = 1/2, i.e., equal split of group earnings. Note that the function is concave,
implying risk aversion. The interior solution of y∗i is then given by
y∗i = y
′
i − ti = X/2 + δiX2/2 (3.2)
Then we can identify δi according to the stakeholder i ’s initial earning y
′
i, transfer
amount ti and total group earnings X. For example, if stakeholder 1 earned 10 points
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in the first phase, while his counterpart stakeholder 2 earned 0 points in the first
phase. That is, y′1=10, X=10. Stakeholder 1 transferred 3 points to stakeholder 2,
i.e., t1=3, y
∗
1=7. We obtain δ1=0.04.
In the first phase of each period, the stakeholders make choices between the safe
and risky alternative. In order for the stakeholders to maximize expected payoff,
their strategy on choosing S or R alternative depends on their prior and updated
belief of other group members’ fairness preferences.
In the Partner One treatment, the payoff structure is described by the utility
functions below. Denote by c1 and c2 the choices of a stakeholder and his/her coun-
terpart in the same group, either S or R. U(c1, c2) is the utility function of the
stakeholder. t1 and t2 denote transfers of the stakeholder and his/her counterpart in
the same group.
U(S, S) = 4 (3.3)
U(S,R) = 0.5[4−t1−[1/2−(4−t1)/4]2/δ1]+0.5[4+t2−[1/2−(4+t2)/14]2/δ1] (3.4)
U(R, S) = 0.5[10− t1 − [1/2− (10− t1)/14]2/δ1] + 0.5[t2 − [1/2− t2/4]2/δ1] (3.5)
U(R,R) = 2.5 + 0.25[10− t1− [1/2− (10− t1)/10]2/δ1] + 0.25[t2− (1/2− t2/10)2/δ1]
(3.6)
Assuming that both stakeholders maximize their utility, we obtain that
ti(4, 0) = 2− 8δi (3.7)
ti(10, 4) = 3− 98δi (3.8)
ti(10, 0) = 5− 50δi (3.9)
40
And then
U(S, S) = 4 (3.10)
U(S,R) = 4.5 + 2δ1 − 49δ2 − 24.5δ22/δ1 (3.11)
U(R, S) = 4.5 + 24.5δ1 − 4δ2 − 2δ22/δ1 (3.12)
U(R,R) = 5 + 6.25δ1 − 12.5δ2 − 6.25δ22/δ1 (3.13)
Similarly, in the Partner Two treatment, we obtain
U(S, S) = 5 (3.14)
U(S,R) = 5 + 3.125δ1 − 56.25δ2 − 28.125δ22/δ1 (3.15)
U(R, S) = 5 + 28.125δ1 − 6.25δ2 − 3.125δ22/δ1 (3.16)
U(R,R) = 5 + 6.25δ1 − 12.5δ2 − 6.25δ22/δ1 (3.17)
So far we have completed the description of the payoff structure of the Partner
treatment in a single period. The equilibrium is jointly determined by two stake-
holders’ own fairness preferences and their expectation of their counterparts’ fairness
preferences. We can obtain their fairness preference parameter according to their
decisions. In each period, partners adjust their belief based on their counterpart’s
alternative choices and redistributive decisions over the previous periods. We assume
that their own fairness preferences are also dynamically updated based on historical
observations over the previous periods.
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3.3.2 Spectator Treatment
A disadvantage of the model above is that it is unable to identify fairness pref-
erences of the spectators, who do not trade off their own payoff and payoff distri-
bution of two stakeholders. Thus we need a second measure of inequality aversion:
β = 2t/∆y, where t is the transfer amount and ∆y is the income gap before redis-
tribution, hence β is between 0 and 1. β equals 0 if the distributor is not inequality
averse, and 1 if the distributor prefers an equal share between the two stakeholders.
This measure is suitable for inequality aversion of distributors in both the Partner-
and Spectator- treatments.
The payoff structure of the Spectator treatment is described as follows. Take
Spectator One as an example. If the utility function of stakeholders is assumed to
be
Ui(yi, σi) = yi − (1/2− yi/X)2/δi
then by maximizing utility we obtain:
U(S, S) = 4 (3.18)
U(S,R) = 4 + β/2− 29(1− β)2/196δ1 (3.19)
U(R, S) = 5− β/2− 29(1− β)2/196δ1 (3.20)
U(R,R) = 5− 0.125(1− β)2/δ1 (3.21)
Similarly, we obtain the utility function of stakeholders in the Spectator Two
treatment
U(S, S) = 5 (3.22)
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U(S,R) = 5− 0.14(1− β)2/δ1 (3.23)
U(S,R) = 5− 0.14(1− β)2/δ1 (3.24)
U(R,R) = 5− 0.125(1− β)2/δ1 (3.25)
On the one hand, spectators can use redistribution to affect the choices made
by the stakeholders over the next periods. On the other hand, spectators adjust
redistributive decisions according to the choices made by the stakeholders in the
previous periods.
3.3.3 General Comparison
Before the main panel VAR analysis, we first deliver some simple statistics from
general comparison between treatments. Figure 1 displays the risk-taking behaviors
of stakeholders in four treatments over 20 periods. In the Partner One- and Spectator
One- treatment, the payment of the safe alternative is relatively lower. Panel A con-
tains the ratio of both stakeholders choosing the risky option in four treatments over
20 periods. Again, more pairs of subjects choose the risky alternative compared to
the Partner Two- and Spectator Two-treatments (54% vs. 27%, p < 0.001, two-way
clustered by subject and period). Depicted in Panel B of Figure 3.1, subjects show
significantly higher tendency to choose the risky alternative compared to Partner
Two- and Spectator Two-treatments (72% vs. 49%, p < 0.001, two-way clustered by
subject and period). However, subjects do not show significantly different risk-taking
behaviors between the two redistributive institutions.
Figure 3.2 draws the trends of fairness preferences measured by β and δ. Panel A
shows that the average β over 20 periods in the four treatments are: βpartnerone = 0.43,
βleviathanone = 0.43, βleviathantwo = 0.39, βpartnertwo = 0.17. Only inequality aversion











































































































Figure 3.2: Inequality Aversion Comparison
two way clustered by subject and period). The reason is that reciprocity is less
attractive for subjects in this treatment. The payment of the safe option is higher,
thus subjects are less willing to rely on reciprocity to ensure their payoffs. This
finding is also supported by comparing δ. Panel B displays δ in equation (3.1):
δpartnerone = 0.07 and δpartnertwo = 0.09 (p < 0.01, two way clustered by subject and
period).
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3.4 Panel VAR Analysis
3.4.1 Estimation Strategy: Panel VAR Model
The model in the previous section provides the key measurements that were used
for the econometric analysis. In order to establish the co-evolutionary relationship
between subjects’ risk preferences and fairness preferences, we employ the panel vec-
tor autoregression (PVAR) approach (Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen, 1988), which
extends the traditional vector autoregression (VAR) proposed by (Sims, 1980) with
a panel structure over time and cross-sectional units, thereby yielding better esti-
mates. A VAR model is ideal for estimating contemporaneous relationships among
a set of possibly endogenous variables. In a VAR, all the variables in the system are
endogenous and interdependent, without worrying about causality direction. Each
variable is determined by its own lags, and lagged values of the other variables in
the system. As a combination of the time-series VAR approach and panel data esti-
mation procedures, the panel VAR provides a powerful tool to analyze the dynamic
relationships among variables in the system in our experiment.
The primary econometric model takes the following unrestricted reduced form
Xit = Γ1Xi,t−1 + Γ2Xi,t−2 + ...+ ΓpXi,t−p + µi + eit (3.26)
where Xit is a vector of variables, including Choice1, Choice2, Income1, Income2,
β in the Spectator treatment and Choice1, Choice2, Income1, Income2, δ1, δ2 in
the Partner treatment. Choice is a binary variable, which equals 1 if R is chose,
or 0 if S is chosen. Γ1, Γ2 ... Γp indicate the matrix coefficients on the lagged
variables. The optimal lag length p is determined by the Akaike information criterion
(AIC) (Akaike, 1969), Schwarz’s information criterion (SBC) (Schwarz, 1978) or H-Q
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information criterion (HQIC) (Hannan and Quinn, 1979). We adopt the selection
criterion proposed by Andrews and Lu (2001) that resembles all of them. A first-
order panel VAR is chosen for both the Spectator and Partner treatment. µi is a
vector of unobserved fixed effects, representing individual-specific characteristics in
our model; eit is a vector of iid idiosyncratic errors.
The variables in the panel VAR model ought to be stationary. So we assess
the assumption of stationarity by several different unit root tests generally used for
panel data. Based on the Fisher principle, Maddala and Wu (1999)’s test assumes
heterogeneity in the autoregressive coefficient of the Dickey-Fuller regression but ig-
nores cross-sectional interdependence across different panel units. The assumption
of independence across panel units is unrealistic in many cases. However, it may fit
our study since the panel units (groups) made independent decisions in our experi-
ment. We also check stationarity using Breitung (2000) and Choi (2001). Pesaran
(2007) proposed the cross-sectional augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADF) test for unit
roots that allows cross-sectional dependence across different panel units. The CADF
test combined the classical augmented Dickey-Fuller with the approximately lagged
cross-sectional mean and its first difference in order to capture the cross-sectional
dependence. The results from the panel unit tests are reported in Table 3.1. Due to
limited space, we only report results from panel unit root tests proposed by Maddala
and Wu (1999) and Breitung (2000).
The standard first-differencing procedure may result in biased coefficients, since
fixed effects are possibly correlated with the explanatory variables in the panel model
. General method of moments (GMM) estimates can be obtained by using the
original variables as instruments for Helmert-transformed variables (Arellano and
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Table 3.1: Panel Unit Root Test Results
Variables Method




Choice (Partner) 0.000 0.500
Choice (Spectator) 0.000 0.000
Income(Partner) 0.000 0.000
Income(Spectator) 0.000 0.000
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). In particular,
X∗it = δt[Xit −
1
T − t(Xi,t+1 + ...+XiT )], t = 1, , T − 1 (3.27)
and
e∗it = δt[eit −
1
T − t(ei,t+1 + ...+ eiT )], t = 1, , T − 1 (3.28)
where δt =
√
(T − t))/(T − t+ 1). That is, variables in each of the first (T-1)
periods are transformed into deviations from their forward means. The weighting δt
guarantees equalized variance and preserves orthogonality in the transformed model.










By this strategy, group fixed effects are removed. And time fixed effects are removed
by ‘Time-Demeaning’ all variables in the system.
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3.4.2 DAG Analysis: Causality Direction and Panel VAR Variables Ordering
Our objective is to investigate the dynamic interactions among variables, i.e., how
one variable of interest reacts to a one-time shock of another variable, while holding
all other shocks constant. The approach we applied to orthogonalize shocks is the
Cholesky Decomposition, which places some restrictions on the variables ordering.
It requires variables that come earlier in the ordering to be weakly exogenous with
respect to the variables that appear later. For instance, if variable A is listed earlier
than variable B, then A would affect B contemporaneously, but not vice versa. How-
ever, variables’ lagged impacts are not restricted by the Cholesky Decomposition.
In order to establish causality direction and panel VAR variables order, we employ
a directed acyclic graphs (DAG) approach from machine learning (Pearl, 2009). A
DAG is a directed graph with no directed cycles. That is, it is formed by a set of ver-
tices connected by directed edges, such that it is impossible to start from some vertex
and eventually loop back again by a sequence of edges. It reveals qualitative causal
directions through the directed graphs analysis of the covariance matrix of e∗it. DAGs
could be interpreted as nonparametric structural equation models (NPSEM)(Robins
and Richardson, 2011).
In a DAG, directed arrows are used to represent contemporaneous causal flows.
If variables are not connected by arrows, then it implies no direct contemporane-
ous causal effect. The LiNGAM (Linear, Non-Gaussian, Acyclic Causal Models)
algorithm developed by Shimizu et al. (2006) is applied to obtain DAGs.
Figure 3.3 displays the causality directions using the software TETRAD (Tetrad,
2006). In the Spectator treatment (panel A), the spectator’s inequality aversion
(β) affected stakeholders’ choices over safe or risky option (Choice1,Choice2), which
then determined their incomes. In the Partner treatment (panel B), a stakeholder’s
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Figure 3.3: DAG in the Spectator Treatment and the Partner Treatment
δ affected his/her choice, and determined earnings along with his/her own choice
and his/her counterpart’s δ, choice and income. Hence the order of variables is
(β,Choice1,Choice2,Income1,Income2) in the Spectator treatment, and (δ1,δ2,Choice1,
Choice2,Income1,Income2) in the Partner treatment.
3.4.3 Impulse Response
The scale and direction of dynamic relationships among the variables are de-
scribed by the impulse response functions (IRFs). Figure 3.4 shows the dynamic
response of choices made in the first phase of each period to one standard deviation
shocks of other variables in the Spectator treatment. Panel A shows the persistent
effect of risk-taking decisions. Panel B delivers the interplay between two stakehold-
ers’ choices over the safe or risky option. We find a weak and transient trend that
stakeholders tried to avoid making the same choice. The interplay between stakehold-
ers’ choice and the spectators’ fairness preferences suggests that more redistribution
leads to higher likelihood of stakeholders choosing the safe option. Further, higher
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Response of Choices in the Spectator Treatment
later periods, while the counterparts’ earnings do not have a significant effect.
The dynamic responses of spectators’ inequality aversion to stakeholders’ choices
and periodly earnings are depicted in Figure 3.5. As shown in the Panel A, the
spectators’ inequality aversion will persist for several periods. Further, the specta-
tors’ fairness preferences are not affected by shocks of the choices made by the two
stakeholders. A positive shock of a stakeholder’ income escalates the redistributive
behaviors of spectators.
Figure 3.6 and 3.7 summarize the dynamic responses of risk-taking behaviors
and inequality aversion to the shocks of other variables in the Partner treatment.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Response of Inequality Aversion in the Spectator Treatment
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as in the previous period, and they tend to imitate their counterpart’ choice in the
previous period. An income shock has a vague effect on choice making. As shown in
Panel C and F of Figure 3.6, the shock of a stakeholder’s own δ is dissolved by other
factors so that it does not significantly affect one’s own choice making. In contrast,
if the counterpart stakeholder is more generous, i.e., smaller δ, this stakeholder will
be more willing to choose the safe option.
Figure 3.7 displays the dynamic response of δ to the shocks of other variables in
the system. A higher likelihood of a counterpart choosing the risky option increased δ
in the long term. That is, stakeholders are reluctant to be generous to a counterpart
willing to take risk. Stakeholders also adjust their inequality aversion according to
his/her own income shocks. Higher income in the previous period leads to more
generosity. Panel C and F in the right reflect the persistence of δ and the reciprocity
between two stakeholders in the same group. The reciprocity can last for a long time.
3.4.4 What Accounts for the Variance of Fairness Preferences and Choices under
Risk? A Cholesky Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition
While the above IRF graphs show the detailed scale and direction of the dy-
namic interactions among fairness preferences and choices under risk. Forecast-error
variance decomposition (FEVD) precisely measures the importance of shocks in one
variable in explaining fluctuations of other variables, by verifying how much of a k -
step ahead forecast-error variance for each variable can be explained by fluctuations
of all explanatory variables. We decompose the relative importance of each variable
in the Spectator- and Partner- treatment in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 respectively.
Choices in the Spectator treatment clearly show an extremely strong auto re-
gressive pattern according to Table 3.2. A stakeholder’s choice was dominantly
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Figure 3.7: Impulse Response of Inequality Aversion in the Partner Treatment
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Table 3.2: FEVD in the Spectator Treatment
Dep. var. Forecast periods Explanatory variables
β Choice1 Choice2 Income1 Income2
Choice1 1 0.01% 99.99% 0 0 0
5 0.50% 97.17% 0.10% 2.20% 0.02%
10 0.50% 97.17% 0.10% 2.20% 0.02%
β 1 100% 0 0 0 0
5 98.69% 0.83% 0.05% 0.37% 0.08%
10 98.66% 0.84% 0.05% 0.37% 0.08%
A 2.20% of variations in choice making can be explained by his/her own previous
earnings. Higher redistribution leads to higher likelihood of stakeholders choosing
the safe option, but its importance is very weak. Spectators’ fairness preferences also
show dominance in auto correlation. They also take the two stakeholders’ incomes
and choices into account, although the importance is not significant.
Choices in the Partner treatment also appear to have an auto regressive pattern
as shown in Table 3.3. But the self-dominance pattern is much weaker than in
the Spectator treatment. About three quarters of variations in choice making can be
explained by itself. The stakeholders take their own inequality tolerance into account,
while they make choices based on their estimates of counterparts’ inequality aversion.
From 20% (one forecast period) to 27% (long term) of the variations in stakeholders’
choices can be explained by the variations in counterparts’ fairness preferences. In
contrast, the importance of their earnings is less.
The stakeholders tend to have a persistence for inequality tolerance. Nearly 97%
of variations in the inequality aversion measure can be explained by itself. The rest
of variations are mostly explained by reciprocity. Their earnings can also affect their
inequality aversion, although the impact is not very important.
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Table 3.3: FEVD in the Partner Treatment
Dep. var. Periods Explanatory variables
δ1 δ2 Choice1 Choice2 Income1 Income2
Choice1 1 9.51% 11.11% 79.39% 0 0 0
5 8.76% 18.22% 72.42% 0.09% 0.38% 0.13%
10 8.88% 18.37% 72.15% 0.10% 0.38% 0.13%
δ1 1 100% 0 0 0 0 0
5 97.79% 1.44% 0.03% 0.03% 0.62% 0.09%
10 97.05% 2.11% 0.05% 0.04% 0.67% 0.09%
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper reported the results of a laboratory experiment investigating how peo-
ple’s fairness preferences and risk preferences evolve. The experimental results are
complementary with theoretical and empirical findings in understanding the evolu-
tion of income inequality and redistribution preferences. Since lagged effects and
endogeneity problems cause difficulty in estimating causal effects in dynamic games
even in a laboratory experiment, we employ a panel VAR model that introduces a
methodology to analyze long term panel data in experimental economics.
Generally speaking, we find different interplay patterns of stakeholders between in
Partner treatment and in Spectator treatment. In the Partner treatment, stakehold-
ers show stronger interplay between fairness preferences and counterparts’ choices.
However, in the Spectator treatment, stakeholders do not affect each other’s choices,
but rely on the spectators’ decisions. Spectators adjust their fairness preferences
according to income inequality between stakeholders but not their risk choices.
3.6 Appendix: Experimental Instruction
3.6.1 General Instruction
Welcome to this experiment!
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Before the session begins, you will carefully read the basic instruction in 20 min-
utes. Please feel free to ask questions if you are confused. You will have to answer
some questions to check that you understand the instructions. During the exper-
iment you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a
question, raise your hand. We will come to answer your questions. Sometimes you
may have to wait a short while before the experiment continues. Please be patient.
Thanks for your patience and cooperation.
Your earnings in the experiment will be calculated in points. Points will be
converted to US dollars at the exchange rate shown on the screen.
Upon the completion of the experiment, you will also receive a participation fee
of $10. At the end of the experiment your total earnings will be paid out to you in
cash.
Following the main choice tasks, we will ask you some questions about your socio-
demographic characteristics. Your responses are helpful in that they can be used to
explain some of the decisions you make in the experimental exercises. Please note
that your responses will not be linked to your name, nor made available to anyone
outside the research team. Your ID number is used to match your responses so that
they are not confused with anyone else’s, and will be used to determine your earnings
from the experiment.
We ask that you not talk with anyone else today except for the designated re-
searchers conducting this experiment.
We expect that the entire session will take about one hour. Your participation is
completely voluntary. You may ask questions at any time during the experiment.
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3.6.2 Instruction in Partner Treatment
In this experiment, you will be randomly matched with another participant for
the rest of the session that will last 20 periods.
Each period includes two stages. In the first stage, you and your counterpart
will independently make a choice between receiving 4 points (option A) and a risky
alternative (option B) that pays 10 or 0 points with equal probability (50/50).
In the second stage of each period, after observing all choices and realized out-
comes for both of you in previous periods, you will decide how many points you will
give to your counterpart if your earning in this current period is higher than your
counterpart.
The redistribution procedure will be skipped in case of equal earnings.
The exchange rate: 5 points= $1
Figure 3.8 is an example of screenshot that subjects see in the Partner Treatment
during the experiment.
3.6.3 Instruction in Spectator Treatment
Welcome to the second experiment!
In this experiment, you will be randomly matched with the other two participants
for the rest of the session that will last 20 periods. In each group, you will be
randomly assigned to be a spectator or one of two stakeholders, and remained the
same role for the duration of the experiment.
Each period includes two stages. In the first stage, two stakeholders will indepen-
dently make a choice between receiving 4 points (option A) and a risky alternative
(option B) that pays 10 or 0 points with equal probability (50/50).
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Figure 3.8: Screenshot: Distributive Decision in Partner Treatment
In the second stage of each period, the spectator will observe all choices and
realized outcomes for both stakeholders in previous periods. Then the spectator will
make redistribution decisions between the two stakeholders.
For example, stakeholder 1 chose to receive 4 points, whereas stakeholder 2 chose
risk alternative and received 10 points due to good luck. After observing their choices
and outcomes, spectator decided to give stakeholder 1 two points from stakeholder
2’s account. Then the two stakeholders’ net earnings after redistribution were 6 and
8 points.
The exchange rate: 5 points= $1
The spectators will receive $20 for the whole session regardless of their decisions.
Figure 3.9 is an example of screenshot that subjects see in the Leviathan Treatment
during the experiment.
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Figure 3.9: Screenshot: Distributive Decision in Leviathan Treatment
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4. SHADOW OF A DOUBT: MORAL EXCUSE IN CHARITABLE GIVING
Decisions on charitable giving are often influenced by the performance of charita-
ble organizations and associated organization costs. The veiled cost may come from
corruption or legitimate administration and advertisement costs. Therefore, under
the shadow, donors are confronted with a tradeoff between helping people in need
and the possibility of being cheated. Individuals may justify not giving while being
able to excuse their selfishness with a self-serving biased belief that the fundraisers
are corrupt. In a laboratory experiment, we find evidence that participants are more
likely to exploit the shadow of fundraising cost to bias their belief and contribute
less when the incentive for selfishness is greater. Moreover, the charitable contri-
bution significantly increases when the moral excuse is removed by excluding the
manipulation of costs by the fundraisers.
4.1 Introduction
Charity plays an important role around the world from ancient to modern society.
The premodern societies have practiced a variety of charitable organizations, such as
Islamic Waqf, medieval Christian church, Israel Kibbutzim, and hospitals in Greece
and Roman Empire. Today, the volume of charity continues to increase. In the
United States, total charitable giving was $358.4 billion in 2014, accounting for 2.1%
of gross domestic product. The largest proporton of charitable giving came from
private donation totally $258.5 billion, or 72% of total giving. About 98% of high net
worth households1 give to charity. In May 2015, there were over 1.5 million charitable
1These individuals typically are defined as having investable finance (financial assets, excluding
primary residence) in excess of $1 million.
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organizations in the United States.2 A great share of charities have contributed to
health and education in the United States.
Despite the importance of charity, efficient and fair provision has been chal-
lenging. Since charitable donation often takes the form of public goods, charitable
institutions and governments have been seeking effective ways to overcome the free
riding problem. For example, governments make charity related policies, such as
the tax treatment of individual and corporate donations. Making efficient regulation
and policy requires a deep understanding of the intrinsic and extrinsic motives be-
hind charitable donation, most of which are subject to debate. Charitable giving is
driven by a complex mixture of pure altruism and self-interest.3 A well-established
literature suggests that motives beyond pure altruism should be included to ex-
plain prosocial behaviors such as charitable giving, e.g., tax avoidance4 , warm glow
(Andreoni, 1989, 1990), inequality aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999), and procedure and intention (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Cox, 2004;
Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). Therefore, understanding the motives driving dona-
tion is not only important for economic theory, but also for improving the efficiency
and fairness of charitable foundations.
This paper studies the motive for charitable giving by investigating the role of
charitable organization costs under the shadow. Although legal regulations prohibit
charitable organizations from engaging in a number of profitable activities5, in real-
2Giving USA 2014.
Access at http://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics/
3See overviews in Andreoni and Payne (2013) and Vesterlund (2006).
4Many governments allow tax deductions for the contributions to charitable organizations. In
the United States, the Revenue Act of 1917 imposed that charitable contribution is tax deductible.
The Obama budget proposal deductions face a lower marginal tax rate. According to the calculation
by the Center on Philanthropy (2009), this resulted in a $1.63 billion reduction in charitable giving
for the first year.
5These activities include but are not limited to: participating in political campaigns at the local,
state, and federal levels; substantial lobbying; benefiting a private shareholder or individual with its
earnings; pursuing private interests; participating in activities unrelated to tax exempt purposes;
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ity, charity foundations charge the ‘commission fee’ with a wide variety and range of
costs. The commission fee may reflect administrative costs, advertisement expendi-
tures6, as well as possible corruption. And also, the requests for charitable donations
may sometimes come from dishonest individual recipients or cheating charitable or-
ganizations. Sometimes, it is possible to track how donations are spent. However,
due to economic and institutional reasons, in many cases detailed spending informa-
tion remains unclear to the public. As a result, donors are confronted with a tradeoff
between contributing to charities for helping others and in some cases being cheated.
Consequently, it raises an important concern when people make decision on charita-
ble donation, especially when contributing to charitable organizations with a large
amount of staff and targeted recipients. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that
concerns about being cheated may not be the whole cause that discourages charitable
giving. People may instead take advantage of the ambiguity of the use of commis-
sion fees (e.g., necessary administrative cost versus corruption) as a moral excuse to
be less generous to the charity while sustaining a positive self-image. Information
about charitable institutions’ performance and costs are not always easily accessible,
especially under unbinding institutions. If donors are unwilling to make an effort to
obtain information about charitable organizations, then they might donate less than
they would if they were more informed, or may not give at all.
Consider, for example, the scandal of the Red Cross China in 2011. A Chinese girl,
Guo Meimei forged her identity by proclaiming to be a fundraising manager of the
Red Cross China. Her display of a lavish lifestyle raised skepticism from the public
towards the Red Cross China. Guo Meimei’s notoriety ruined the reputation of the
Red Cross in China, and people questioned if Red Cross China misused charitable
and acting or intending to act illegally (List, 2011).
6Charity organizations spend an average of nearly $100,000 per year on fundraising, with only
12% going to donations (Andreoni and Payne, 2011).
64
donations. Although this scandal is one of the main causes of the sharp decline in
charitable donations in China, the reduction in charitable giving may not be purely
driven by the skepticism against Red Cross China. Even though Red Cross China
denied any relationship with Guo Meimei shortly after the incident, the public still
doubted and donations sharply declined.
Although the anecdotal evidence seems widespread, few quantitative studies have
been conducted to examine the potential effects of charitable reputation and self-
serving bias on donations. In a laboratory experiment exploring the interplay be-
tween charitable organization and donors, we provide a direct test of the hypoth-
esis that the ambiguity of charitable organization’s performance can be used as a
self-biased moral excuse to contribute less. In the baseline game, participants were
randomly chosen to play the role of Participant 1 (henceforth the ‘donor’), or the role
of Participant 2 (henceforth the ‘charity manager’).7 After being randomly paired,
the donor received 20 dollars and was asked to distribute it between him/herself and
the paired charity manager. At the same time, the charity manager was asked to
determine the rate of commission fee, either 20% or 50%, at which each dollar he/she
would charge on the donation from the paired donor and leave the rest to the Texas
Disabled Veterans Association.8 To elicit the self-serving bias, we also asked the
donors to guess the number of charity managers in the room who chose 50% as the
rate of commission fee. The task was incentivized and worth a $20 bonus if answered
correctly.
7During the experiment, we avoid the use of words such as ‘donor’ and ‘manager’. We use
‘Participant 1’ and ‘Participant 2’ instead.
8The Texas Disabled Veteran Association is a well-known charitable organization that provides
charitable and volunteer outreach and service to veterans seeking the benefits acquired through
military service, provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs and other local government and
community agencies. Their aim is to maximize the quality of life and opportunities for retired,
active duty, wounded and disabled veterans and their immediate family members as well as the
disabled community.
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To test our major hypothesis, we extend the baseline game in two ways. First,
in a high private return (HPR) game, we manipulate the incentive for being selfish
and the self-serving bias by a higher return rate of private investment. While the
other settings are unchanged, every dollar a donor kept in his own account increased
his earnings by $1.5 in the HPR game. Therefore, compared to the baseline game,
the HPR game answers the following questions: if people have a higher level of
contradictory interest between self-interest and altruism, are they more likely to use
the ambiguity of the commission fee to excuse their selfishness? Or equivalently, are
donors more likely to guess a higher number of charity managers in the room who
chose the higher commission fee (50%) while being less generous to the charity?
Second, in an exogenous commission fee (ECF) game, the commission fee rate
is randomly determined, rather than by the managers. That is, the exogenously
determined commission fee rate excludes the responsibility of the managers, and
prohibits the possibility for donors to maintain a self-serving belief that the charity
managers would choose the higher commission fee. If our hypothesis holds, then
donors would contribute more in the ECF game than in the baseline game.
The experimental results support our hypothesis. First, donors appear more self-
ish in the HPR game than in the baseline game. Second, they report a significantly
higher proportion of managers who would choose the higher 50% commission fee, im-
plying a greater self-serving bias while the incentive for selfishness is larger. Third,
when the possibility for charity managers to manipulate the commission fee is elimi-
nated in ECF game, donors are less selfish. Our estimates are robust to the inclusion
of controls for subjects’ gender, race, religious, political and ideological preferences.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We discuss the related literature
in Section 2. Section 3 describes the design and procedures of the experiment. Section
4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes and discusses implications.
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4.2 Related Literature
Our research is related to several strands of literature. First, there is a fair amount
of evidence for the impact of social image on giving (Garicano, Palacios-Huerta, and
Prendergast, 2005; Gerber, Green, and Larimer, 2008; Mas and Moretti, 2009; Meer,
2011; DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier, 2012). For example, in a natural field ex-
periment with door-to-door fundraising, DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2012)
find that many individuals do not want to give but dislike saying no. If they received
a flyer with the exact time of solicitation, many of them will not open the door, in
order to avoid direct interaction with the funder-raisers. A closely related literature
underscores the role of social image. Donors take into account not only the outcomes
but also the social image and the revealed intentions behind the outcomes. Givers in
the dictator game show their generosity in order to signal the social image of their
fairness to the audience (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). Dana, Cain, and Dawes
(2006) allow the dictators to choose if they play a $10 dictator game or ‘opt-out’
the game with $9 leaving the recipient unaware of the existence of the allocation
possibility. The opt-out option substantially reduces generosity, since it avoids the
revelation of selfishness. Shang and Croson (2009) provide suggestive evidence in
a field experiment that publically announcing donations of others significantly in-
creased contribution to public goods. Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber (2012) also
found similar evidence in laboratory experimental games. Taken together, the lit-
erature suggests that giving does not only reflect a pure concern for the welfare of
others, but also a desire to avoid psychological costs of hurting their social image
built on the recipient’s expectation. Our study builds on the social image literature
but emphasizes more on self-serving bias. People believe what they want to believe
that is consistent with their own interest.
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Our paper is also related to a vast literature on how information about the re-
cipients affect charitable giving. Eckel and Grossman (1996) show that subjects
in laboratory dictator games contribute more to the American Red Cross than an
anonymous recipient. Andreoni and Rao (2011) show that two-way communication
can substantially increase transfers in a dictator game. Fong and Oberholzer-Gee
(2011) investigate the impact of endogenous information in a dictator game setting
with different types of poor recipients.9 While the dictators can purchase the signals
about the source of poverty, one third of dictators pay to learn about their recipi-
ents, and mostly exploit the information to reduce their giving. Excessive appeals
may reduce charitable giving because it is considered as a signal of adverse selection
(Van Diepen, Donkers, and Franses, 2009). In an empirical study, Diamond and No-
ble (2001) provide evidence that donors can develop defense mechanisms by throwing
out mail solicitations as a response to frequent request. Conversely, seed money, as
a signal of the health of the charitable organizations, can increase charitable giving
(List and Lucking Reiley, 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 2003; Karlan and List, 2007).
However, as shown in our experiment, information may not only affect charitable
giving as a signal, but also through building self-serving bias.
A recent experimental study close to ours is Kandul (2016). In a dictator game
with ex-ante uncertainty about the recipient’s endowment, he found that donors
made no significant difference in the transfers with or without ex-post information
revelation. But if the donors were given the opportunity to choose if they would
like to receive such information, nearly one-third of them chose to ignore the ex-post
9There is a substantial literature in experimental economics that discusses the entitlement of
earnings. Earnings from work effort are considered as more legitimate than from pure luck (Cherry,
Frykblom, and Shogren, 2002; Durante, Putterman, and van der Weele, 2014; Fershtman, Gneezy,
and List, 2012; Hoffman et al., 1994; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008). Following a similar logic, people
are more willing to help people suffering from an accident, but often refuse to support others who
need help because of lacking self-control (e.g., drug abuse) (Fong, 2001).
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information, while others gave significantly more. The ex-post ignorance serves to
build a self-biased belief. Our experiment differs from Kandul (2016) in an impor-
tant way, the self-serving bias is built on ex-ante and uncertainty is exogenously
determined. Di Tella et al. (2015) is another close study, in which allocators avoid
altruism by distorting their belief about the selfishness of others. Our experiment
eliminates reciprocity in two-party games and focuses on altruism and self-serving
bias in a charitable giving environment.
4.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
This experiment includes three games in total. We start the illustration of the
experimental design with the baseline game.
4.3.1 Baseline Game
In each session, one half of the participants were randomly chosen to play the
role of Participant 1 (the ‘donor’), and the other half played the role of Participant 2
(the ‘charity manager’). They were anonymously and randomly paired. Participants
were not able to find out the identity of the person they were paired with.
In each pair, the donor received $20 and was asked to distribute it between
him/herself and the charity manager. At the same time, the charity manager was
asked to set the commission fee rate to keep in his/her own account. The commis-
sion fee rate was either 20% or 50%. The rest of the transfer from the donor not
kept by the charity manager went to the Texas Disabled Veterans Association. The
donation transaction was conducted at the end of the experiment and observed by
all subjects. For example, consider the scenario in which a donor kept $10 and de-
livered $10 to the paired charity manager who set the commission fee to be 50%. In
this case, the charity manager kept $5 and the charitable organization received $5
from this pair of participants. It is worthy to note that in contrast to many existing
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experiments with one side uncertainty, the participants in our experiment made deci-
sions simultaneously. Hence, in the baseline game both sides of our experiment faced
ex-ante uncertainty about the choices made by their counterpart. In other words, al-
though $20 of the total endowment and the possible commission fee rate are common
knowledge, the donor did not know the commission fee rate chosen by the manager
until the distributive decision had been made, and the manager was unaware of the
amount they will receive from the donor when choosing the commission fee. Before
revealing the outcomes, the donors were asked to guess the number of managers in
the room who chose the higher 50% commission fee. The correct answer was worth
a $20 bonus, which is a significant incentive for donors to report their truthful belief.
4.3.2 High Private Return Game
The high private return (HPR) game is almost identical to the baseline game.
The variation lies on the return rate of money to the donor’s private account. In
the HPR game, every dollar a donor keeps in his/her own account increases private
earnings by $1.5. The higher return to private investment induces a greater incentive
for donors to be less generous based on a self-biased belief that the managers would
be more likely to choose the higher commission fee rate. We use the bonus question
to elicit donors’ belief on the decisions made by the managers.
4.3.3 Exogenous Commission Fee Game
The exogenous commission fee (ECF) game is exactly the same as the base-
line game, except that the commission fee rate is randomly determined with equal
probability, rather than chosen by the charity managers, which is known to all sub-
jects. In this game, the donors received information about the commission fee rate
before making the distributive decision. This setting discharges the responsibility
of the charity managers, and prohibits the possibility for the donors to maintain a
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self-serving belief that the managers will choose the higher commission rate.
At the end of the experiment subjects filled out a questionnaire, including de-
mographic questions such as gender, race, religion and ideology, as well as attitudes
about the experimental procedures and payoff.
The experiment was computerized with the software ‘z-Tree’ (Fischbacher, 2007)
and conducted at Texas A&M University. We used a between-subjects design. 204
subjects participated in the experiment, 78 subjects in the baseline game, 76 sub-
jects the HPR game, and 50 subjects in the ECF game. Each subject participated in
only one session . Each session lasted about 60 minutes, including sign-up, consent,
decision-making, and payment delivery. Before entering the laboratory, participants
were told that they would receive a show-up fee of $10 upon completion of the tasks
and they would also receive potential of extra payoffs based on their role, luck and
decisions. But they were unaware of details of the experiment. To ensure under-
standing of the experimental procedures by all subjects, a set of test questions need
to be correctly answered before the experiment began. The average payment was $25
for the donors and $13.4 for the charity managers respectively. The Texas Disabled
Veteran Association received $557 in total from this experiment, or equivalently $5.5
per pair of subjects on average.
4.4 Results
We begin the analysis with a simple comparison of the selfishness of donors be-
tween games. We define Selfishness as the gap between the amount of money a donor
kept and the amount he/she contributed. Furthermore, to measure the self-serving
bias of donors, we define Guess as the stated proportion of charity managers in the
room a donor believed to choose 50% as the rate of commission fee. The main hy-
pothesis of our paper can be tested by comparing the mean values of Selfishness and
71
Guess of donors across the three games (Table 4.1). In the baseline game, Selfishness
is $3.23 on average, less than 50% of that of the donors in the HPR game ($7.96).
The difference is considerable and significant on the edge (p=0.09). Donors reveal
more generosity in the ECF game with Selfishness being only $0.88, although the
large standard deviation lowers the statistical significance. Regarding the self-serving
bias measured by Guess, compared to the baseline game, the greater incentive for
selfishness in the HPR game increases Guess from 53% to 69%, with a p-value of
0.03.
Table 4.1: Selfishness and Self-Serving Bias
Baseline HPR ECF H0: Baseline=HPR H0: Baseline=ECF
Selfishness 3.23 7.96 0.88 p =0.09 p =0.44
(11.78) (12.06) (11.63)
Guess 0.53 0.69 p=0.03
(0.31) (0.30)
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in the parentheses. p-values are reported for
two-side t-tests. Mann-Whitney tests report similar results.
One potential concern of a simple comparison is that subjects were not randomly
treated. Hence in Table 4.2 we present regression-adjusted tests of the mean differ-
ences in self-serving bias between the baseline and HPR games. In every column we
regress Guess on the dummy indicator of HPR game under different specifications.
Column 1 does not include any control variables. The treatment effect is estimated
to be 16%, which is identical to the result in Table 4.1. In column 2, we control
for gender and race differences in the regression. Column 3 further adds other con-
trol variables including self-reported recent donation history, ideology, religion, and
political affiliation. Compared to column 3, column 4 excludes the recent donation
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history and religion, both of which have many missing values. All the estimates
provide a similar magnitude of self-serving bias.
Table 4.2: Comparing Self-Serving Bias between Games by Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Guess Guess Guess Guess
Game=HPR 0.16** 0.16** 0.19** 0.16**
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Controls No Gender & Race † §
R2 0.07 0.22 0.47 0.26
Observations 77 77 63 74
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
†: Controls variables include gender, race, the recent donation history, ideology, religion,
and political affiliation. We allow empty entry for most questions but not gender and
race. Since donation history and religion are more private, some subjects refused to
respond.
§: Controls include the control variables in †but exclude the recent donation history
and religion.
In Table 4.3 we further provide regression-adjusted mean differences in Selfishness
between the baseline and HPR games. The results in Table 4.3 suggest varying
quantitative evidence of different selfishness between the two games. Donors are more
selfish in the HPR game with greater incentive to be less generous. The statistical
significance has a plausible trend toward significance.
It is interesting to explore the extent to which the donors utilize self-serving bias
to excuse their selfishness. Hence we investigate the correlation between Selfishness
and Guess by simple regressions in Table 4.4. In column 1 by pooling donors in
the baseline and HPR games, the correlation suggests that a ten percentage point
increase in Guess is associated with about $0.7 additional Selfishness. More inter-
estingly, we find different correlations between selfishness and self-serving bias by
separating the two games in columns 2 and 3. In the baseline game with relatively
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Table 4.3: Comparing Selfishness between Games by Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Selfishness Selfishness Selfishness Selfishness
Game=HPR 4.73* 6.41** 6.28 5.90*
(2.72) (2.94) (3.99) (3.09)
R2 0.04 0.18 0.34 0.20
Controls No Gender & Race † §
Observations 77 77 63 74
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
† and § are the same as before.
low incentives to excuse selfishness by self-serving bias, the correlation is attenuated
and insignificant. In contrast, as seen in column 3, donors in the HPR game show
a strong tendency to exploit the self-serving bias to justify their lack of generosity.
This provides additional evidence in support of our findings.
Finally, we compare the payoff and self-reported satisfaction of donors across
games. In our survey, subjects report their satisfaction on a scale from ‘very disap-
pointed’ to ‘very satisfied’ (e.g., 1-5 in numerical measure). The null hypothesis is
that payoff is positively correlated with the satisfaction of payoff. However, Table
4.5 shows that making higher profit does not satisfy donors, since they adjust their
expectation of payoff by their biased beliefs of fairness and charity managers’ choices.
Table 4.4: Correlation between Selfishness and Self-Serving Bias
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome Variable: Selfishness Baseline & HPR Baseline HPR
Guess 7.23*** 3.78 9.58***
(2.05) (3.13) (2.70)
R2 0.14 0.04 0.25
Observations 77 39 38
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.5: Payout and Satisfaction of Donors across Games
Baseline HPR ECF Baseline = HPR Baseline=ECF
Payout 14.18 18.88 10.44 p =0.01 p =0.04
(7.71) (8.20) (5.82)
Satisfaction 4.15 4.21 4.04 p =0.75 p =0.64
(0.84) (0.70) (1.06)
4.5 Concluding Remarks
The results of this article speak to charitable fundraisers and related policy makers
that seek more efficient financial donations, while also contributing to the behavioral
economics literature. The findings of this laboratory experiment add to our under-
standing of the motives for charitable giving and provide policy relevance to make
charitable fundraising more effective. We provide suggestive evidence that donors
have strong propensity to excuse their selfishness by self-serving biased belief that
fundraisers are corrupt. Participants in our experiment are more likely to exploit
the shadow of fundraising costs to contribute less while the incentive for selfishness
is higher. Eliminating the moral excuse by excluding the fundraisers’ manipulation
of commission fee significantly increases charitable giving.
Our experiment also sheds light on the policy implication for fundraising and
charitable regulation. Legitimate fundraisers can differentiate themselves by provid-
ing transparent information about how donations are spent. Since it is likely that
misinformation and bad public image of one charity may have spillover effects to
other charitable institutions, the information about the performance of charitable
organizations is a public good in nature. Accordingly, we suggest that governments
and NGOs should spend resources on detecting and disclosing information about
charitable organizations and recipients. Market design to improve the efficiency of
charitable markets will provide promising avenues for future research.
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A disadvantage of this study is that our result is limited to the laboratory envi-
ronment. We believe that future research on philanthropic-related issues can benefit
from naturally occurring field events. Furthermore, charitable giving is not lim-
ited to money; time effort makes up a large part of charitable contribution. In the
United States, about 65 million adults volunteered 7.9 billion hours of public service,
equivalently a estimated value of $175 billion.10 Cross-country analyses suggests
that well-being is positively correlated with monetary giving, but the relationship
between time giving and well-being is weaker and more ambiguous (List and Price,
2011). Hence the heterogeneous effects of monetary contributions and time effort
contributions should be explored in the future.
4.6 Appendix: Experimental Instructions
For sake of brevity, in the appendix, we only briefly describe the experimental
instructions in the baseline game with screenshots in ‘z-Tree’. The instructions in
other games are similar.
Upon entering the laboratory, participants received and signed the consent form.
All subjects first read a general instruction (see Figure 4.1). Then the subjects were
randomly assigned as Participant 1 or Participant 2. Participant 1 read the instruc-
tions in Figure 4.2 and 4.3. At the same time, Participant 2 read the instruction as
shown in Figure 4.3.
After reading the instruction, they were asked to answer the questions to ensure
understanding (see Figure 4.4).
Once they correctly answered all the questions, they make their decisions simul-
taneously. But the subjects playing the role of Participant 1 had an opportunity to




Figure 4.1: General Instruction
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Figure 4.2: Instruction for Participant 1, Part I
Figure 4.3: Instruction for Participant 1, Part II
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Figure 4.4: Test Questions
Figure 4.5: Bonus Question for Participant 1
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5. CONCLUSION
A growing literature suggests that social preferences should be included in eco-
nomic models to explain how people behave differently from pure self-interested and
rationality. Policy makers and welfare program designers should also take fairness
preferences into account while implementing and evaluating the effectiveness of poli-
cies.
In the three interrelated essays of this dissertation, experimental method is em-
ployed to elicit fairness preferences under risk and uncertainty. The first essay in-
vestigates fairness preferences and redistribution under different rooted risks, specif-
ically whether the risk is exogenously assigned in a pure-luck control condition or
endogenously chosen by subjects in an option-luck treatment. By comparing the
redistributive decisions between the control condition and treatment, we reconcile
the competing fairness views by suggesting that people tend to support the account-
ability principle in the presence of relatively lower income inequality but are more
inclined to consequential egalitarianism in case of large income inequality or salience
of extreme low payoff. We believe that the results are not only important for inter-
preting some prosocial behaviors but also shed light on social and economic policies,
such as health insurance plans, job training programs, and so on.
In the second essay we explore the dynamic evolution fairness preferences, risk
preferences in a laboratory economy in which and income inequality are jointly de-
termined under different redistributive policies. This essay introduces a panel vec-
tor auto-regression model to compare different interactive patterns between the two
treatments. We find that in the Spectator treatment, stakeholders tend to make
decision independently, while they mainly rely on the spectators’ decisions. By con-
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trast, in the Partner treatment, stakeholders show a stronger interplay in reciprocity
and choice making.
The third essay imitates the environment of charitable contribution, in which
donors are confronted with a tradeoff between helping people in need and the pos-
sibility of being cheated. Donors excuse their selfishness by sustaining a self-serving
biased belief that the fundraisers are corrupt. Donors believe what they want to
believe that is consistent with their self-interest. The findings of this experiment
deepen our understanding of the motives behind charitable giving and shed light on
policy implications to make charitable fundraising more sufficient and effective.
Experimental economics has also some caveats, especially in laboratory experi-
ments. The most important challenge is the concerns about ‘external validity’. Field
experiments, alike lab experiments, also randomize subjects into treated and con-
trol groups and infer causal effects by comparing outcomes between these groups.
Field experiments have the advantage that behaviors and outcomes are observed in
a naturally occuring environment rather than in a laboratory environment differently
from the real world. Accordingly, field experiments are often seen as having higher
external validity than laboratory experiments (Harrison and List, 2004; Levitt and
List, 2009; List, 2009). Future work can be conducted by extending these laboratory
experiment into the field.
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